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Until recently rigorous impact evaluations have been rare 
in the area of finance and private sector development. 
One reason for this is the perception that many 
policies and projects in this area lend themselves less 
to formal evaluations. However, a vanguard of new 
impact evaluations on areas as diverse as fostering 
microenterprise growth, microfinance, rainfall insurance, 
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and regulatory reform demonstrates that in many 
circumstances serious evaluation is possible. The purpose 
of this paper is to synthesize and distil the policy and 
implementation lessons emerging from these studies, use 
them to demonstrate the feasibility of impact evaluations 
in a broader array of topics, and thereby help prompt 
new impact evaluations for projects going forward.   
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Introduction 
The recent external review of World Bank research noted that “perhaps the most 
important role of Bank research is to learn what works, and to widely disseminate the 
results” (Banerjee et al. 2006, p. 148). Rigorous impact evaluations, which compare the 
outcomes of a program or policy against an explicit counterfactual of what would have 
happened without the program or policy, are one of the most important tools that can be 
used along with appropriate economic theory for understanding “what works”. Despite 
this, until recently impact evaluations have been rare, especially outside the areas of 
health and education.
1  This is now particularly apparent in the area of finance and 
private sector development, where the recent financial crisis has prompted renewed 
attention to knowing what works in terms of getting finance to consumers and firms, and 
in getting the private sector growing again.
2
  One reason for the lack of impact evaluations in this area is the perception that 
many finance and private sector development (hereafter FPD) policies and projects lend 
themselves less to formal evaluations.
  
3
                                                 
1 For example, the Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Initiative has until recently focused on topics 
in health and education. See 
 Changes in laws or regulations may occur at an 
economy-wide level, or a large loan may only be given to one or two banks or firms. 
However, in many cases it is still possible to formally evaluate FPD policies or projects. 
Regulations may be implemented in some regions and not others, or apply only to firms 
of a certain industry or size. Generally available programs or policies may have low take-
up that can be raised through targeted interventions. And in a non-trivial number of cases 
it will indeed be feasible to implement a randomized experiment. The purpose of this 
paper is to demonstrate the feasibility of such impact evaluations, distil the lessons of 
these new evaluations for policymakers and practitioners, and help prompt new impact 
evaluations for projects going forward.  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,menuPK:3998281~p
agePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3998212,00.html [accessed February 4, 2009]. 
2 See also the recent World Bank Policy Research Report on Access to Finance which calls for more impact 
evaluation (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008). 
3 A second reason may be that research on FPD has historically worried less about the challenges of 
identification that are a prime concern of the labor and applied microeconomics literature. Financial 
economists are much less likely to be exposed to impact evaluation methods in their graduate classes than 
health, education, or labor economists. A further purpose of this paper is thus to better expose practitioners 
in the FPD field to the ideas and possibilities of impact evaluations.   - 3 - 
  We begin by highlighting policy and implementation lessons from four  areas 
where impact evaluations are beginning to emerge: microenterprises, microfinance, 
rainfall insurance, and regulatory reform. We use impact evaluations in these areas to 
illustrate various methods which are possible when evaluating FPD reforms, as well as to 
note some of the key challenges to their effective use. We then discuss several reasons 
why these policy areas are at the forefront of FPD impact evaluations, which leads to a 
discussion of where the biggest opportunities appear to be going forward for new 
knowledge generation of what works.  
  Many of the examples discussed here will come from randomized experiments, 
which have increasingly become the preferred method of evaluation for many 
development economists (Duflo and Kremer, 2005). Randomized experiments offer 
many advantages for evaluation, chief among them being that they ensure that they only 
reason why some firms, consumers, or other units are subject to a policy or program and 
others are not is pure chance. This also makes the results easy to communicate to 
policymakers.  
However, recently there has been a debate about whether the profession is over-
emphasizing randomization (Rodrik, 2008; Deaton, 2009; Ravallion, 2009; Imbens, 
2009). Many of the issues discussed, such as for whom the treatment effect is identified 
for, and whether the results are generalizable to other  settings, are also important 
considerations in using non-experimental methods. There are three lessons from this 
debate that I consider important for the discussion in this paper. The first is that we must 
not let methodological purity determine which questions to try and address: just because 
a policy cannot be randomized does not mean we should give up on trying to understand 
whether it is working or not. Indeed this paper considers a range of approaches that can 
be used for ensuring more rigorous impact evaluation. Second, studies need to go beyond 
a simplistic black-box approach of “does this work or not” to try and understand why and 
how it works, and for whom? Finally, I agree with Imbens (2009) who argues that given 
the question which  one is interested in answering is possible to answer with 
randomization, there is little to gain and much to lose by not randomizing. 
Randomization is not always  feasible, but I do not know of a single study that has   - 4 - 
credibly argued that they could have randomized, but choose not to do so because of a 
belief that they would get a more rigorous assessment of impact by not randomizing.  
 
What Have We Learned? 
Raising the incomes of the self-employed 
Self-employment accounts for a large share of the labor force in most developing 
countries. For example, Gollin (2002) reports that in Ghana, Bangladesh, and Nigeria, 
75-80 percent of manufacturing workers were self-employed.  Self-employment is 
particularly important among the poor. Banerjee and Duflo (2007) find that between 47 
and 69 percent of urban households who live on less than US$2 per day in Peru, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Nicaragua own a non-agricultural business. A central question 
for policymakers is then how to raise the incomes of these poor businesses, and whether 
in fact the typical microenterprises owned by the poor have any ability to grow. 
  In the absence of market failures, a standard model of firm size determination 
(e.g. Lucas, 1978) would argue that the answer is no – the reason for firms being small in 
such models is that their owners have low entrepreneurial ability.  Of course market 
failures are pervasive in many developing countries, with restrictions on access to credit 
being a notable example. However, an influential branch of theory suggests that in the 
presence of credit constraints, the prospect of microenterprise growth from small 
investments is low, due to production non-convexities (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). 
The argument is that the profitable investments facing a business are lumpy (e.g. a new 
machine), and that without sufficient access to external credit, individuals who start a 
business too small will be trapped in poverty, earning low returns. Conversely, if these 
non-convexities are not important, then if small firms are operating well below the 
optimal production point (given their entrepreneurial ability), we might expect the returns 
to additional capital investment to be particularly high.    
  However, assessing the extent to which a lack of capital hampers the income 
growth of microenterprises is complicated by the fact that firm owners with more capital 
stock or greater access to credit are likely to differ in a host of other ways from owners 
with less capital, such as in terms of entrepreneurial ability in the Lucas model. Two 
recent randomized experiments in Sri Lanka and Mexico (de Mel et al. 2008a and   - 5 - 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008) illustrate one approach to impact evaluation which can 
resolve this problem and credibly identify the impact of additional capital on firms. 
Grants of between US$100 and US$200 were given to a randomly selected subset of poor 
microenterprises in each country. The authors can then compare the profits of firms 
which randomly received these grants to those which did not, to determine the extent to 
which grants raise business incomes.
4
                                                 
4 Comparing profits requires knowing how to measure the profits of microenterprises which are usually 
informal and keep few records. Impact evaluations have been useful for learning what works in this regard 
too (see de Mel et al., 2009). 
 Their results challenge the somewhat conventional 
wisdom that subsistence firms have no scope for group (see Table 1 for a summary of key 
results from studies in this paper). They find the grants do substantially raise incomes for 
the average firm receiving a grant, and estimate real returns to capital of 5.7 percent per 
month in Sri Lanka and 20 percent per month in Mexico, much higher than market 
interest rates in both countries. They explore heterogeneity in the treatment effects in an 
attempt to understand why the returns are so high. They find returns to be highest for 
high ability, credit-constrained firm owners, which is consistent with the view that credit 
market failures prevent talented owners from getting their firm to its optimal size.  
   These randomized experiments show grants work in raising incomes for the 
average microenterprise owner. In the particular research studies, the grants were not part 
of a government or NGO program, but rather given out by the researchers and funded 
through research grants. However, there are several cases where governments have 
employed grants as a way of raising the incomes of the self-employed. An example is the 
Microemprendimientos Productivos program in Argentina which provided financial 
support in the form of in-kind grants to finance inputs and equipment to beneficiaries 
with the aim of helping them obtain a sustainable source of income and reduce their 
dependence on welfare payments (Almeida and Galasso, 2007). The Mexican Jovenes 
con Oportunidades program provides grants to youth for completing the last few years of 
schooling, with these grants kept in bank accounts that can be accessed for paying for 
further study or for starting a business.  Grants to microenterprises are also more common 
in disaster recovery situations, such as following the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 
2004 (de Mel et al, 2008c).    - 6 - 
  A question which faces policymakers who wish to give grants to raise the 
incomes of microenterprises is whether these grants should be in the form of unrestricted 
cash, or made in-kind, as was the case with the Argentine program.
5 In the randomized 
experiments in Sri Lanka and Mexico, half of the grants were given as cash, and the other 
half as raw materials and equipment for the businesses (chosen by the owner). The 
authors find in both studies that there is no difference between the two forms of grant: 
they result in approximately the same change in capital stock and same increase in 
business profits. If business owners have profitable opportunities to expand they will 
invest additional cash in these opportunities. If they do not, then any inputs or equipment 
they provide will crowd out the investments they would have made on their own, and 
they can sell excess capital stock if it is not yielding a return. This suggests that 
policymakers can achieve the same results with the cheaper and easier to administer cash 
grants.
6
  Impact evaluations are not only useful for showing what works, but also what 
does  not. This can guide new policy experiments. A first example of this from the 
microenterprise experiments is that while the grants succeeded in raising the incomes of 
male business owners, the average return to capital for women receiving the grant in Sri 
Lanka was zero (the Mexican study contained only men). Grants alone thus did not work 
in raising the incomes of self-employed women. In follow-up work, de Mel et al. (2008b) 
combine the experimental results with several theoretical models to try and understand 
why the grants did not work for raising business income for women. They find that 
women did not invest smaller grants in the business, while the larger grants invested in 
the business had low returns. They speculate that a possible explanation for this is 
inefficient household use of resources, with other household members capturing a share 
of the income and working capital held by women, leading women to use fixed business 
assets as a store of value rather than simply for production. They also find returns to be 
 
                                                 
5 This parallels the debate in the conditional cash transfers literature as to whether the conditions attached 
to cash grants matter (see Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). Our finding of no differential effect of conditioning 
does not immediately carry over to other forms of conditioning, such as conditioning on school attendance 
or health clinic visits, since firm owners can undo the conditioning of being required to spend the money on 
their business more easily than they can undo other types of conditions – e.g. in theory they could devote 
less time to school work at home if children attend school more, but this seems less likely. 
6 Although conditional grants may be still prepared from a political economy perspective, since grants may 
be easier to sell to the public if they are conditioned on the recipients “using them properly”.   - 7 - 
particularly low in business sectors dominated by women. This has led to ongoing field 
experiments designed to determine the impact on business profits of getting women to 
shift into sectors which both men and women work in, as well as a replication of the 
study in Ghana to understand whether the same gender differences emerge in a country 
with much higher female participation rates in self-employment. 
  A second example of what does not work from this same body of work is that 
although the one-time grants succeed in raising the incomes  of male poor business 
owners, they do not lead to significant employment creation. A comparison of the 
characteristics of microenterprise owners with those of wage workers and owners of 
firms with five or more employees suggests that only one-quarter to one-third of 
microenterprise owners have attributes such as ability, motivation, and ambition similar 
to that of larger firm owners (de Mel et al., 2008d). The key question for policymakers is 
then how to unleash the employment-creating potential of these select microenterprise 
owners. In addition to access to credit, business training and business development 
services have been the typical programs governments have tried to do this. However, to 
date there has been little rigorous evaluation of business training programs
7
The previous section demonstrated that one-off grants can raise the incomes of the 
average microenterprise owner. Grants to certain vulnerable groups, and perhaps even 
large sections of the poor, may be sustainable as part of a government social protection 
program (the Oportunidades program in Mexico covers 5 million households, almost 
one-quarter of Mexico’s population).
, something 
which ongoing evaluations hope to correct. 
 
Rethinking the central precepts of the microfinance movement 
8
                                                 
7  An exception is Karlan and Valdivia (2008) who find that business training increases the sales and 
repayment rates of female microfinance clients in Peru. 
   However, in terms of finance and private sector 
development policies, most of the focus on households and microenterprises has been 
through microfinance. The most famous example of microfinance is that of the Grameen 
bank, and the model of microfinance most strongly associated with it is group lending to 
women at low interest rates. Recent impact evaluations (along with the success of 
8  See  http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/Wn_Inf_General/Padron_Liq/Cober_Aten/index.html  [accessed 
February 5, 2009].   - 8 - 
microfinance institutions such as Banco Compartamos in Mexico which offers individual 
loans at quite high interest rates to both men and women) give strong reasons to question 
this archetypical model of microfinance as necessarily the best way to expand access to 
finance to the poor and to improve the small business sector going forward.
9
  Many microfinance organizations focus almost exclusively or largely on female 
borrowers. For example, 97 percent of Grameen Bank’s seven million borrowers are 
women
 
10, as are 70 percent of FINCAs borrowers
11, and 65 percent of ACCIÓN’s five 
million clients.
12
  Group liability is often hailed as one of the central innovations of the 
microfinance  movement, mitigating both the adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems which can give rise to credit market failures. The idea is that borrowers who 
know they will be liable for the debts of others in their group will have an incentive to 
screen others so that only reliable people will join their group, and then to monitor their 
group members to ensure they invest their funds wisely and exert enough effort. 
However, as Giné and Karlan (2008) note, group liability has several pitfalls which may 
cause it to be disliked by many borrowers. It may be particularly troublesome for small 
business owners, who might be discouraged from undertaking somewhat risky but high 
return projects by other group members, may need different size loans or different loan 
periods from other group members, and find frequent group meetings costly in terms of 
 While part of this reflects a social mission, many of the justifications are 
economic in nature. Women are argued to be poorer than men on average (e.g Burjorjee 
et al., 2002; FINCA, 2007), have less collateral, and hence be more credit-constrained 
(e.g. Khandker, 1998, Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). But if this is the case, when 
women do receive access to credit, it should generate higher returns than when men 
receive access. The experimental evidence from Sri Lanka (and supporting non-
experimental evidence from Mexico and Brazil) in de Mel et al. (2008b) provides a 
reason to question this extensive focus on women, and a suggestion that more products 
need to be developed to fit the needs of urban male clients. 
                                                 
9 See Cull et al. (2009) for a description of the heterogeneity in the microfinance sector, and the debate 
generated by the successful stock offering of Banco Compartamos. Karlan and Morduch (2009) provide an 
excellent overview of recent research on access to finance. 
10 http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.html [Numbers as of May 2007], accessed August 15, 2007. 
11http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2604299/k.FFD9/What_is_Microfinance_What_is_
Village_Banking.htm, accessed August 15, 2007. 
12 http://www.accion.org/about_key_stats.asp [all clients 1976-2006], accessed August 15, 2007.   - 9 - 
time.  Finally, there is also a concern that group liability loans are less useful for 
establishing credit records in credit bureaus than individualized loans, making graduation 
to larger loans more difficult (de Janvry et al., 2008). 
  Giné and Karlan (2008) carried out a randomized experiment with a microfinance 
bank in the Philippines to investigate the extent to which group lending really reduces the 
moral hazard problems. Half of the group-lending centers of the bank were randomly 
chosen to be converted to individual liability. They find no change in default rates after 
one and three years in the converted centers, and faster client growth in the converted 
branches. These results suggest that group liability is not that important for reducing 
moral hazard, but since the converted loans were all initially screened by groups, the 
paper can not say anything about the importance of groups for screening out bad risks. 
Ongoing work by the authors is examining this issue, comparing newly formed groups to 
new individual loan clients. 
  The third precept of microfinance that has been strongly challenged by recent 
impact evaluations is the belief that serving the poor requires low interest rates. 
Muhammad Yunus (2007) states “a true microcredit organization must keep its interest 
rate as close to the cost of funds as possible”, criticizing the high interest rates being 
charged by Banco Compartamos.  This lies at the heart of the debate on 
commercialization of microfinance (see Cull et al., 2009 and Harford, 2008). However, 
the high returns to capital for many microenterprises in Sri Lanka and Mexico suggest the 
ability to repay loans at rates significantly higher than market interest rates. The problem, 
especially for urban business owners seeking individual loans, is often one of access 
rather than interest rate. In follow-up work in Sri Lanka, de Mel et al. (2009b) find that 
few of the high return microenterprises qualify for a loan from microfinance banks, 
which lend on a basis of physical collateral and not on whether the owner’s business 
shows high prospects for growth. 
  The most striking evidence that high interest rate loans can improve welfare 
comes from a study of consumer loans in South Africa. Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
conducted a randomized experiment with a microlender, in which applicants which were 
marginally rejected for consumer loans were randomly selected into two groups, one of 
which received a second look and higher probability of getting a loan. The loans were 4   - 10 - 
month loans at a monthly interest rate of 11.75 percent (equivalent to an APR of 200% 
per year). Despite these high interest rates, the authors find that six to twelve months later 
the marginal loan recipients were more likely to have kept their job, had higher incomes, 
and experienced less hunger. This is not to argue that the customers would not have been 
even better off had loans been available at lower interest rates. But at the existing rates, 
not only did the customers benefit, but these marginal loans appear to have been 
profitable for the bank. 
  This study illustrates well some of the pros and cons of trying to build policy on 
the basis of a randomized experiment. The impacts estimated are credible and easily 
understood by policymakers. They are the impacts for marginally rejected consumers, a 
group of interest certainly to the bank. However, the fact that this group can benefit a lot 
from additional access to high interest rate credit is not informative about whether poorer 
individuals who are far from the creditworthy cutoff would stand to benefit from high 
interest rate loans – other studies are needed to look at this question. 
  To be sure, these existing impact evaluations consist of only a couple of rigorous 
studies from a couple of countries, and it will be important to see if the results are 
repeated in replication studies. Nevertheless, the results do suggest reasons to question 
the structure of the prototypical microfinance product. Moreover, despite the rampant 
expansion of microfinance worldwide and tremendous amount of attention this has 
received in the media, to date there has been little rigorous impact evaluation of the 
welfare effects of the basic microfinance product.
13 Several large-scale randomized trials 
of microfinance are currently nearing completion. The first preliminary results from a 
randomized trial involving 2,400 households in India were recently presented by Esther 
Duflo.
14
                                                 
13 See Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) for a summary of different non-experimental approaches that have 
been used to measure impact. The most well known of these is Pitt and Khandker (1998), who employ a 
regression discontinuity design. There is some debate as to the extent to which the regression discontinuity 
applied in practice, see the discussion in Armendáriz and Morduch. 
 While the full results are not yet available, two points to note are first, take-up 
was only 17.5 percent. That is, most households offered a loan did not want one. Second, 
the preliminary results show very modest impacts, with no significant effects on health or 
education, and relatively little use for business purposes.  As more results become 
14 Presentation by Esther Duflo at the Innovations for Poverty Action 2008 Microfinance Conference at 
Yale University. Discussion of these results is covered at 
http://www.philanthropyaction.com/nc/the_real_impacts_of_micro_credit/ [accessed February 5, 2009].   - 11 - 
available from this and other impact evaluations of microfinance going forward, it will 
lead new impetus to policy efforts in the microfinance domain.  
 
Insuring poor farmers 
Missing credit markets are one important reason why firms  in developing 
countries are less productive than they could be. However, reluctance to take-up credit 
may be linked to the existence of another important market failure, the lack of an 
insurance market. This may be particularly important in occupations such as farming, 
which are subject to substantial income risk from rainfall variation during the growing 
season. One solution which has been proposed and introduced in a number of countries is 
Rainfall Index Insurance, which links payouts to rainfall at local rain gauges. 
  An important question of interest is then whether offering this rainfall insurance 
works in increasing the use of credit by risk-averse farmers. A randomized experiment 
conducted by Giné and Yang (2009) among farmers in Malawi finds evidence that it does 
not. The authors worked with the Malawian farmers’ association, financial institutions in 
Malawi, and the Commodity Risk Management  Group of the World Bank to offer 
smallholders credit to purchase high-yielding seed varieties. Farmers in some localities 
were randomly selected to be just offered credit, while those in other localities were 
offered a bundle of credit and insurance. Take-up of the credit was 33 percent for farmers 
offered the loan without insurance, and only 17.6 percent for farmers who were offered a 
loan bundled together with rainfall insurance.  
  Take-up rates of rainfall insurance have also been low elsewhere – Giné et al. 
(2008) report a take-up rate of only 4.6 percent for one product in India. In a cross-
sectional non-experimental setting, they find that risk-averse households are actually less 
likely, not more likely, to purchase the insurance, especially when they are unfamiliar 
with other types of insurance and the insurance provider. They attribute this to 
uncertainty about the insurance product, which as a new technology requires some risk 
and trust to participate in it. In follow-up randomized experiments in India, Cole et al. 
(2008) investigate the sensitivity of the take-up decision to price, the presence of an 
endorsement from a third trusted party, means of presentation, and liquidity constraints.   - 12 - 
Their results are consistent with the view that in addition to price and liquidity, trust and 
financial literacy influence take-up to a significant degree. 
  These studies have several implications for efforts to develop better insurance 
products for the poor. In addition to finding that price matters, the findings on trust and 
financial literacy suggest scope for modifying implementation and marketing in a way 
which will boost demand. To the extent that poor farmers are unable to understand 
complicated insurance products, as an introductory product to get people used to the idea 
of insurance, a simpler product design with fewer thresholds and payment schedules may 
be preferred to a more complicated product that offers more complete insurance.
15
                                                 
15 This is not to preclude also offering the more complicated products at the same time, and letting farmers 
choose between them. An alternative would be better financial education to teach the participants how to 
learn this product. Cole et al. (2008) implemented brief (5 to 10 minute) training sessions on this, which 
they found had no effect. 
 For 
example, a product that pays out if rainfall is below 150mm during the specified period 
and does not if rainfall is above is simpler to understand than the more standard product 
that, in the example in Cole et al. (2008, p. 9), “pays zero when cumulative rainfall 
during a particular 45 day period exceeds 100mm. Payouts are then linear in the rainfall 
deficit relative to this 100mm threshold, jumping to Rs. 2000 when cumulative rainfall is 
below 40mm”. It would be interesting in future impact evaluations to compare the take-
up and efficacy of simpler designs to more complex designs. 
  Secondly, the authors find take-up to be much higher in villages where a positive 
past insurance payout has occurred. They conclude from this that it would be useful to 
modify the contracts to ensure they pay out a positive return with sufficient frequency as 
to engender trust in the population, whereas the standard contracts pay out very rarely. 
The trade-off here is that for the same insurance premium, more frequent payouts mean 
smaller amounts can be paid out each time, resulting in less complete coverage of 
catastrophic losses to compensate for greater coverage of more common losses. Third, 
since liquidity constraints mattered a lot for take-up, they suggest that it might be 
beneficial to bundle the insurance product together with a loan. The results in Malawi 
shows this results in less credit uptake than if pure loans were offered, but it might offer 
greater insurance uptake than if insurance alone was offered, and would not preclude 
offering a separate loan-only product.   - 13 - 
Learning from regulatory reform 
The impact evaluations profiled above used randomized experiments to randomly 
offer the program to selected individuals, firms, banking branches, farming localities, and 
slum areas. However, this approach to evaluation may not be possible with some forms of 
FPD projects, such as reforms in the regulatory environment. Nevertheless, in many cases 
rigorous impact evaluation is still possible. We illustrate this through consideration of 
two recent studies which have conducted impact evaluations of regulatory reforms.  
  The view that burdensome regulations are an important barrier to private sector 
development was famously expressed by de Soto (1989), who calculated that it would 
take 289 days, 11 permits, and over $1,000 to legally register a small business in Peru. 
This emphasis on regulatory reform has been further spurred by the World Bank’s Doing 
Business  project, which ranks countries each year on both the overall ease of doing 
business, and on the extent of reforms undertaken in the previous year.  The 2009 report 
notes that almost 1000 reforms have been recorded in the areas measured by Doing 
Business have occurred in the past six years, with the most common reform being one 
which makes it easier to start a business by reducing the costs and number of procedures 
needed. Yet despite the huge number of reforms, there is almost no rigorous impact 
evaluation of these reforms. 
  An exception is found in Bruhn (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2007), who study the 
impact of business registration reform in Mexico. The reform was organized by a federal 
agency, but implemented at the municipal level since many business registration 
procedures were set locally. Due to staffing constraints, the federal agency could not 
implement the reform in all priority municipalities at once, but instead staggered the 
reforms, introducing them first in some municipalities and then later in others. Among 
the municipalities identified as priorities for implementation, there was no specification 
of which should go first. This allows the author to use municipalities in which the reform 
was introduced later as a control group for the municipalities in which it was introduced 
earlier, using a difference-in-differences estimation methodology. This estimation 
essentially looks at the period where the first few municipalities had reformed and others 
had yet to. It then compares the change in the number of registered businesses (or in other 
outcomes of interest) for those municipalities where the reform was introduced early to   - 14 - 
the change in these same outcomes for municipalities where the reform was introduced 
later. This is an estimation strategy that is likely to be applicable in understanding a 
number of other regulatory reforms, which might be phased in over time.
16
  The headline result from both Bruhn (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2007) is that the 
reform succeeded in increasing registrations. This is where the most simplistic measures 
of impact would stop. For example, World Bank (2008) reports that following a reduction 
in the minimum capital requirement, there was an increase in new company registrations 
of 55 percent in Georgia and 81 percent in Saudi Arabia.
 
17
  We also want to know what the consequences of these reforms are for the 
economic outcomes we ultimately care about, such as employment generation, consumer 
 But to know if a reform 
worked and why, we want to go beyond did it lead to more businesses, to understand how 
and why? In the specific example of business registration reform, an important question 
of interest is whether these new registrations are the results of existing firms registering, 
or of new firms starting up. Bruhn (2008) finds that the increase in registrations comes 
from new entry, not from the conversion of existing informal firms.  
 This result suggests there may be a group of potential self-employed for whom 
the burden of registering is a barrier to business formation; but once this pool of pent-up 
demand is exhausted, there may be much less long-term impact. The results here do not 
support de Soto’s  (1989) view that existing informal small business owners are 
individuals who wish to become formal, but are stymied by high barriers to registration. 
They are more consistent with the view that the majority of informal businesses are 
informal by choice, because becoming formal offers no benefit to them. Indeed, 
McKenzie and Sakho (2009) estimate that for Bolivian small firms, there are huge gains 
to becoming formal for the subset of informal firms who do not know how to become 
formal, but that becoming formal would be costly to the remainder of informal firms. 
                                                 
16 Note that the validity of this difference-in-difference estimation strategy relies on an assumption that the 
municipalities which reform later are a good comparison group for what would have happened to the earlier 
reform municipalities in the absence of early reform. Bruhn (2008) carries out a number of checks on pre-
existing trends and municipality characteristics to argue this is the case. This strategy will be less applicable 
if countries decide to, for example, first introduce the reform in the capital city or business capital, and then 
roll the reform out to progressively smaller cities.  
17 Note that these numbers for Georgia and South Africa are not even the true impact on the number of 
registrations, since they are a simple before-after comparison and do not control for pre-existing trends or 
concurrent events in the economy.   - 15 - 
welfare, and economic growth. Bruhn (2008) finds the Mexico reform increased 
employment by 2.8 percent after the reform, and benefited consumers by decreasing 
prices by 0.6 percent, likely as a result of additional competition. However, in doing so, it 
reduces the income of incumbent registered business owners. Since municipal level GDP 
is collected only every five years, it is not possible to look at the overall impact on 
economic growth. 
  Although in some cases reforms might be introduced in a staggered fashion into 
some regions of the country first, a more common experience is for the reform to be 
introduced for the entire country at once. But even in this situation, it is often the case 
that the reform only applies to, or should theoretically only have consequences for, a 
subset of the population. One special case of this is when the policy only applies to firms 
above (or below) some particular size threshold. A relatively common example of this 
occurring is in the area of labor regulation, where employment protection rules might 
apply only to firms above a certain number of workers.
18
  More typically reforms introduced at the country level may affect only some firms 
or industries, but not others.
  For example, both Italy’s 
employment protection legislation and Sri Lanka’s termination of workmen act place 
much more onerous requirements on firms with 15 or more employees. In some 
circumstances this might allow evaluation of the effects of the reform by comparing firms 
just above the threshold to those just below, a regression discontinuity design. This is 
done for Italy by Leonardi and Pica (2006).  However, in practice such regulations will 
often cause firms to sort themselves around the size threshold, making this approach to 
evaluation more challenging. Abidoye et al. (2008) find some evidence that this is the 
case in Sri Lanka, with firms slower to grow from 14 to 15 workers than from 13 to 14 
workers or from 15 to 16 workers.  
19
                                                 
18 Priority lending also may have size thresholds. See Banerjee and Duflo (2008) who study a reform in 
India which increased the maximum size limit for firms to be eligible for priority-sector lending. They then 
use a triple-difference evaluation strategy, comparing the change in the rate of changes in outcomes before 
and after the reform for firms that were newly eligible for priority lending compared to firms that were 
already eligible. 
19 Another example is seen in Kugler et al. (2005), who study a reform of Spain’s labor law, which applied 
only to some demographic groups such as young workers, older workers, women under-represented in their 
occupations, and disabled workers, but not other groups. 
  This allows for a difference-in-differences estimation 
strategy in which unaffected firms or industries are used as a comparison group for those   - 16 - 
affected by the reform. An example of this is seen in Giné and Love (2006), who evaluate 
the impact of a bankruptcy reform in Colombia which reduced the costs of re-organizing 
a bankrupt firm. Their goal is to see whether the law change led to distressed, but viable 
firms, being more likely to reorganize when they would have previously liquidated. Since 
active, non-bankrupt firms are not affected by the law, they can use a difference-in-
difference strategy to compute  the  difference in the characteristics of bankrupt firms 
selecting into re-organization rather than liquidation after the law was reformed relative 
to the characteristics of active firms, relative to this same difference pre-reform. They 
find that lowering the costs of re-organization led to an improvement in the efficiency of 
the bankrupt procedure, with more viable firms now more likely to be re-organized than 
liquidated relative to the pre-reform situation.  
 
Lessons for Implementation of Impact Evaluations 
The impact evaluations summarized above have begun to yield important policy 
lessons for work with microenterprises, microfinance, rainfall insurance, and regulatory 
reform. These are all important components of finance and private sector development 
policy, yet they only cover a fraction of the important policy tools and research areas in 
the FPD domain. The questions which then arise are why these few areas have been at the 
forefront of evaluation efforts to date, and what lessons do they hold for other evaluations 
going forward?  
 
Why have these subject areas dominated evaluation efforts to date? 
A substantive reason why these topics have been at the forefront of evaluation 
efforts  is that they  have close ties with important bodies of theoretical work in 
development economics, and that in many cases the theory suggests reasons both why the 
policy may have its intended effect, as well as reasons why it may not work in practice. 
For example, in the grants to microenterprises, one body of theory suggested returns to 
capital may be very low due to non-convexities, while another body suggested returns 
could be high due to credit constraints with convex production technologies. Likewise 
there are theoretical reasons why group lending may have benefits, as well as reasons 
why it may deter certain types of borrowers.  These cases where the impact of the   - 17 - 
program is theoretically uncertain motivate empirical studies to see what happens in 
practice.  
  A more practical reason is that these studies are all in areas where evaluation is 
most feasible for a variety of reasons. The first is one of sample size. The policies studied 
are ones where the units of analysis are consumers or firms, allowing the comparison of 
the impacts on many affected units to a control group of many other units. The second is 
one of data availability. The regulation studies relied on unusually good existing 
databases in Mexico (a quarterly labor force panel survey and administrative data from 
the Mexican social security system) and a comprehensive database on the universe of 
bankruptcy cases in Colombia. The other studies were designed as ex-ante evaluations, 
with data collection designed by the researchers. The randomized experiments done to 
date have generally been conducted by researchers working with NGOs or funding the 
programs through research grants. This has limited study to either programs which have 
been run by NGOs willing to work with researchers, or to projects which are cheap 
enough for research grants to fund.  
  Going forward this calls for a need for continued close interaction between theory 
and evaluation – we want to know not just whether or not something works, but why, and 
how? It also suggests that widespread rigorous evaluation of the many other types of FPD 
programs and policies implemented by governments and supported or advised by 
international financial institutions requires a much greater commitment to evaluation, and 
in particular, to planning ahead so the evaluation process (including data collection) can 
start before the program is implemented. It also suggests unexploited benefits exist from 
small modifications in currently collected sources of data which do not presently have 
policy evaluation in mind. For example, surveys of firms should include questions on 
participation in particular types of policies or projects (e.g. does your firm participate in a 
business cluster developed by the government under its regional clustering program), and 
include enough identifying information to link with administrative records on banks, 
firms, or consumers participating in such programs. And unfortunately even when such 
data is collected, access to the microdata is often limited in many countries, so greater 
data accessibility is also needed. 
   - 18 - 
Evaluation of many FPD programs is possible 
The studies highlighted above have demonstrated a variety of methods that can be 
used for evaluating FPD policies – randomized experiments, difference-in-differences, 
and regression discontinuity designs. There are a variety of other evaluation methods 
available which when used carefully can also be informative as to policy impacts. We 
highlight here three  of these other methods which are also likely to be useful in 
evaluating a broad array of FPD policies.
20
  A second method is the control function approach introduced by Heckman, which 
involves explicitly modeling how unobservables which affect the outcome are related to 
the observables, including the choice of participation in a program or policy regime. This 
approach is used along with propensity-score matching by Fajnzylber et al. (2006) to look 
at the impact of access to credit, training, and membership in business associations on 
 
  Propensity-score matching is a commonly used method for estimating a treatment 
impact. An example in the FPD literature is seen in Oh et al. (2008) who evaluate the 
impact of a credit guarantee policy used by the Korean government to support small and 
medium enterprises in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. The authors use plant-
level panel data on manufacturing firms and match firms which received credit 
guarantees to similar firms which did not, finding that the guarantee program positively 
affected both survival rates and sales and employment growth of the firms receiving the 
guarantees. A concern with propensity score matching is that it assumes the process of 
which firm receives a guarantee and which does not can be adequately captured by a set 
of observable variables which the firms are matched on. How plausible this is will be a 
judgment  call in any given setting, and benefit from detailed knowledge of how the 
program was actually implemented. In general the literature has found the results to be 
closer to those obtained in an experimental setting when a rich set of data can be used for 
the matching, including multiple periods of pre-program data to control for existing 
trends. The data used by Oh et al. (2008) do not meet these criteria, with only data from 
one year (2000) for a relatively limited set of firm characteristics being used. This 
suggests one should be cautious in accepting their results. 
                                                 
20 For a good recent general reference to different estimation strategies for impact evaluation, see Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2008). Instrumental variables is another common technique for evaluation which we 
won’t explicitly discuss here – McKenzie and Sahko (2009) provide an example in FPD.   - 19 - 
microenterprises in Mexico. Traditionally these methods have relied heavily on 
functional form assumptions and distributional assumptions such as joint normality, 
which can lead to significant bias when these assumptions do not hold and as a result 
such methods have fallen out of favor in much of development economics. However, 
recently semi-parametric approaches have been developed which rely less on these 
assumptions, but which still need an exclusion restriction to hold (see Heckman and 
Navarro-Lozano, 2004 for a review and comparison to matching). This need for an 
exclusion restriction takes us back to the need to answering the underlying question 
needed for evaluation: thinking of an exogenous reason why some firms, consumers, or 
other units participate in a program and others do not. 
  A  third  method which is likely to be applicable for a wide variety of FPD 
evaluations is an encouragement design (Diamond and Hainmueller, 2007). This can be 
useful when evaluating a program that is implemented at the country-level, such as a 
change in regulation or in policy. The basic idea behind this design is that firms (or other 
units of interest) are randomly divided into a treatment and a control group. While the 
program is available to all, the treatment group receives additional encouragement to 
participate in the program – for example they might receive marketing visits to make 
them more aware of the program. If the encouragement is successful it yields a difference 
in program take-up rates between the two groups which can then be used in evaluating 
the impact of the program. More precisely, what can be estimated is the impact of the 
program on units which would take up the program when offered encouragement but 
which would not otherwise.  
An example of an encouragement design being successfully used is seen in de 
Janvry et al. (2008), who examine the impact of the introduction of a credit bureau in 
Guatemala. While the credit bureau is in place for everyone, knowledge of its 
implementation was found to be almost non-existent in surveys conducted soon after its 
implementation. The authors therefore randomly informed a subset of 5,000 microfinance 
borrowers about the existence of the bureau and how it works. They find this awareness 
of the bureau leads to a modest and temporary increase in repayment rates, and to 
microfinance groups ejecting their worse-performing members.     - 20 - 
The IFC has recently attempted encouragement designs in two evaluations, an 
ongoing evaluation of business registration in Lima, Peru where firms receive 
encouragement to register; and an evaluation of an alternate dispute resolution (ADR) 
project in Macedonia. The preliminary results from the Macedonia project also illustrate 
the potential downside of this approach in estimating the impact – the encouragement 
might not encourage very many units to take-up the program.
21
  A key difference between evaluation of most FPD programs and many impact 
evaluations in education and health lies in take-up. In programs such as vaccination 
campaigns or get children to school programs, the goal of the program is to have all 
eligible individuals participate. And in the case of cash transfers, participation can be 
close to universal. In contrast, universal take-up is not the goal of most FPD programs, 
and even when it is a goal, it is seldom the reality. Not all households or firms will want 
or need a loan, register formally, or wish to purchase insurance. This is evident in some 
of the studies profiled above: take-up rates of 17.5 percent for microfinance, 5 to 33 
percent for rainfall insurance, and no increase in the number of firms in the informal 
sector registering to become formal when regulations changed.  
 The Macedonia project 
tried several methods of encouraging use of the ADR mechanism, but found that none of 
these encouragement methods succeeded in raising use. This prevents estimation of the 
effect of the ADR on firms. Nevertheless, a finding that no one wants to participate in a 
program, even when encouraged, is in of itself a useful result for understanding the likely 
program impact. More detailed analysis of why firms do not take-up the program can 
then be used to improve the program going forward. 
 
The importance of take-up 
  Less than universal program take-up offers both challenges and opportunities for 
impact evaluation. Learning what the level of take-up is, and which characteristics predict 
take-up can be useful for refining and modifying the policy to enable it to better reach its 
goals in the future. For example, the low take-up of risk-averse individuals in the rainfall 
insurance papers, coupled with the fact that take-up was much higher when there had 
been a recent pay-out in the village or when there was an endorsement from a trusted 
                                                 
21 Discussion of the Macedonia results is based on correspondence with Alexis Diamond in the IFC.   - 21 - 
third party can help guide marketing efforts and product design in the future. It can lead 
to revealing other market or government failures where policy action is required.
22
There are two solutions to this problem of power. The first is to employ a very 
large sample size, so that the resulting sample will still contain enough firms or 
households which take-up the program to enable the researchers to detect a program 
impact of a given size. However, the downside of this is that it can be very expensive. For 
example, consider a program such as a new loan product or business training that aims to 
raise  the profits of microenterprises undertaking the program by 25 percent. A 
randomized experiment which offered the program to half the firms and used a single 
follow-up survey to estimate this impact would require a sample size of 670 firms if take-
up was 100 percent, but need a sample size of 2,700 with 50 percent take-up, and of 
67,000 with 10 percent take-up.
 
Finally, take-up rates and characteristics can also be useful for gauging the potential 
market for taking pilot trials to scale.  
  However, low take-up also offers several challenges for attempts to rigorously 
evaluate FPD programs. The first is one of power to detect the program effect. For 
example, one of the ultimate goals of the work on rainfall insurance is to find out if 
rainfall insurance allows farmers to farm more efficiently, and protects their households 
against negative shocks. However, because few farmers purchased the insurance, and 
those who did purchase only purchased enough to cover a trivial fraction of their crops, 
the existing studies do not allow the researchers to determine the impacts on production 
and household welfare.  
23
                                                 
22  For example, de Mel et al. (2009b) worked with a regional development bank to try and help 
microenterprises obtain loans. Despite 62 percent of firms showing up for information meetings, only 10 
percent received loans. One reason was that in the absence of a credit bureau, applicants had to travel to 
other institutions and obtain letters from them attesting that they had no outstanding loans, thereby 
increasing the cost to applicants of applying for loans. This experience highlights the need for credit 
bureaus to cover microfinance. 
23 These calculations were made using the sampsi command in STATA, assuming a constant treatment 
effect, a coefficient of variation of 1, which is in line with what one typically sees in microenterprise data 
after trimming outliers, that the treatment has no effect on the variance of profits, and for power of 0.90 and 
test significance level alpha of 0.05. 
 An example of a randomized experiment with sample 
sizes of this magnitude is seen in Karlan and Zinman (2009) who randomized 58,000 
direct mail offers issued by a South African lender, with 8.7 percent of those contacted 
applying for a loan.    - 22 - 
  The second solution to the problem of low power from low take-up is to restrict 
study to a group of units for whom take-up would be much higher. For example, a 
business training program could be advertised to all eligible firms or microfinance 
clients, and then the number of slots available in the program could be randomly 
allocated among the group of interested firms. A related example is seen in Karlan and 
Zinman (2008), in which consumers first apply for loans, and then the pool of marginally 
rejected candidates (all of whom wanted a loan) is then randomly assigned to receive a 
second look at getting a loan. The advantage of this second approach is that it requires 
much smaller samples to detect a treatment impact. The downside is that of external 
validity – the program impact estimated will apply only to the self-selected group of 
individuals or firms which expressed interest in the program, not to the general 
population. In some cases however this might be precisely the impact of interest – for 
instance, policymakers might want to know what the effect of their loan program is on 
firms interested in taking up credit.  
  The second challenge offered by low take-up is one of interpretation of program 
impact. Consider evaluating the impact of microfinance on microenterprise profitability 
in a situation where take-up of loans is only 10 percent. With a randomized experiment, 
comparison of the mean profits of firms offered  the microfinance treatment to those 
which were not offered the microfinance treatment yields the average intention-to-treat 
effect. This is the impact on firms of being offered credit. This in itself is a parameter of 
interest, but in most cases we would also like to go further and know what the impact of 
the credit was if it was actually taken up. The standard approach is to instrument receipt 
of microfinance with the randomly determined offer of credit. However, if the impact of 
receiving credit varies by firm, what is recovered is known as a local average treatment 
effect (LATE) (Angrist and Imbens, 1994). This is the average effect of receiving credit 
for firms which would take-up the microfinance treatment when offered. If firms which 
stand to benefit more from credit are the ones who take it, this will overstate the gain in 
profit which the average firm would receive if it got microfinance.
24
                                                 
24 See Heckman et al. (2006) and Deaton (2009) for more discussion on interpretation of treatment effects 
when the take-up decision is a choice which is related to the individual unit’s program effect. Ravallion 
(2009) also discusses some related issues in the use and interpretation of experiments. 
 What this means in 
practice is that there needs to be care taken in interpreting program effects with low take-  - 23 - 
up, and in deciding whether the parameter estimated is in fact one of policy interest. 
Researchers can also go further in understanding the underlying observable sources of 
heterogeneity in the take-up decision and in treatment effects. 
 
What Should We Learn? 
 
The previous sections have shown that evaluation of FPD programs and policies 
is possible in a wide variety of contexts, and that the small number of evaluations to date 
are yielding useful lessons for both policy design and future evaluation efforts.  The 
question is then where should we go from here? While we have argued that there is much 
greater scope for serious evaluations than is currently being realized, two general areas 
are particularly attractive for increased efforts. 
The first is more evaluations in the areas that have been at the forefront of 
existing efforts: microfinance, microenterprises, insurance, and regulatory reform. We 
noted that there are a number of features of these policy domains that lend themselves to 
rigorous evaluation. Yet there are currently only a handful of rigorous studies. More are 
needed on a wider range of policies in a number of different institutional settings, to learn 
what works, where, and why? 
The second general area where there appears to be unexploited gains to be made 
from impact evaluation is in looking at the effects of other programs and policies that are 
widely used to benefit large numbers of consumers and firms. Three such important 
policy areas where evaluation seems possible, yet is currently almost non-existent, are 
financial literacy and consumer protection, business training, and policies to enhance the 
SME sector.  
The subject of financial literacy has received increased policy attention in recent 
years, with worldwide efforts underway to role out financial literacy training. For 
example, Citi Foundation is four years into a ten year, $200 million global program of 
financial education, operating in 65 countries  and a number of governments have 
developed programs in this area.
25
                                                 
25 See 
  The recent global financial crisis has also turned 
attention to issues of consumer protection, and the possible macroeconomic 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/financialeducation/ [accessed February 10, 2009].   - 24 - 
consequences of consumers entering into credit transactions that they do not fully 
understand. Financial literacy programs are ripe for evaluation efforts, since despite the 
increasing amounts of money, there are always groups of consumers that receive the 
program and others that do not. The challenge for evaluation is making these two groups 
as similar as possible, and measuring the outcomes.  
One preliminary study in Indonesia has found teaching financially illiterate 
individuals about the benefits of bank accounts did lead to an increase in bank account 
use among this group, with no increase for those who were already financially literate 
(Cole, Sampson, and Zia, 2009). Moreover, they find small incentive payments to have a 
much larger effect on getting individuals to open bank accounts and to be three times as 
cost-effective as financial education in this regard, suggesting a need for some skepticism 
in judging some of the lofty claims of proponents of financial education. This fledging 
effort provides a good base for future evaluations to build on, with the ultimate goal of 
finding out under what circumstances such programs work, when they do not work, and 
what the consequences on consumer welfare are.  
  A second area which is ripe for experimentation and impact evaluation lies in 
business training programs. Many microfinance organizations, NGOs, and governments 
worldwide offer short courses to budding or existing microenterprises to teach them the 
basics of running a small business. Public sector funding of such programs may be 
justified from a poverty alleviation standpoint, since even if the programs worked and 
had large benefits, credit constraints  and risk aversion might prevent poor people 
participating. Again in these programs one can design impact evaluations by comparing 
firm owners which are offered the training to similar individuals that are not offered the 
training. Several randomized experiments currently in the field are attempting to do this. 
  The last area I wish to stress as being particularly full of unexploited possibilities 
for impact evaluations lies in policies directed at the SME sector. These include SME 
lending policies, trade credit policies, management training, and sector-specific technical 
assistance. These programs are typically carried out by governments and international 
financial institutions (IFIs) rather than NGOs, and are too expensive for researchers to   - 25 - 
typically fund the program on offer themselves.
26
This paper has surveyed the existing literature on impact evaluations in finance 
and private sector development with two main aims. The first was to draw emerging 
policy lessons and implementation lessons from the slowly growing set of rigorous 
impact assessments that have been carried out in areas such as microfinance, 
microenterprise growth, rainfall insurance, and regulatory reform. The second aim was to 
use the lens of these existing evaluations to demonstrate some of the different strategies 
for evaluation that are possible, and to argue that much more impact evaluation is 
possible than has currently been attempted.
 As a result, there is a real knowledge 
gap – and an opportunity to be grasped. If governments and operations staff at IFIs can 
work with researchers in evaluating the many projects being implemented, it should be 
possible to rigorously evaluate many of the policies being carried out for SMEs, and to 





                                                 
26 A nascent effort to evaluate a few of the IFC’s programs has been underway for a few years. IFC 
(undated) describes some of these efforts. However, to date these efforts have to my knowledge not 
resulted in any working papers or published articles.  
 Hopefully policymakers and operational 
staff reading this paper will agree with this message, and join together with researchers in 




27 The Finance and Private Sector Development team of the Development Research Group has recently 
introduced a new impact note series to try and better disseminate the results of new impact evaluations 
which do occur. See http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance/impact to see the latest in FPD impact 
evaluations.   - 26 - 
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Table 1: Summary of Main Findings
Study Policy or Program Studied Main results
Panel A: Results that largely confirm or support conventional wisdom
Bruhn (2008)  Business registration reform - reform increased the number of registered firms and 
and Kaplan et al. (2007) in Mexico employment. Less in line with conventional wisdom, Bruhn
shows this is from new entry, not formalization of existing firms.
Gine and Love (2006) Bankruptcy reform in Colombia - reducing reorganization costs improves efficiency of 
bankruptcy process, with more viable firms more likely to be 
re-organized and less viable firms to be liquidated.
Oh et al. (2008) Credit guarantee policy in Korea  -guarantees improved survival rates, sales growth, and 
to support SMEs during crisis employment growth
de Janvry et al. (2008) Introducing a credit bureau in - awareness of the bureau leads to a modest and temporary
Guatemala increase in repayment rates and to microfinance groups ejecting
worst-performing members.
Panel B: Results that challenge or overturn conventional wisdom
de Mel et al. (2008a,b) Conditional and Unconditional - returns to capital are high for male-owned firms,
grants to microenterprises in   but zero for female-owned firms
Sri Lanka - no difference between conditional and unconditional transfers
Gine and Karlan (2008) Removing group liability in   - no change in default rates when joint liability removed, and
microfinance groups in  faster client growth in converted branches
the Philippines
Karlan and Zinman (2008) High interest rate consumer - high interest loans let marginal recipients to be more likely
loans in South Africa  to keep their jobs, have higher incomes, and experience less
 hunger
Gine and Yang (2009) Offering rainfall insurance to  - take-up is extremely low, so that insurance leads to little
and Cole et al. (2008) farmers in Malawi and India  risk mitigation or changes in farmer behavior
Cole, Sampson and Zia (2009) Financial literacy training in  - program had zero impact on the general population, but 
Indonesia increased bank account use for financially illiterate. However,
small cash payments had much more effect than financial
education.  